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NarratiNG the NatioN 




Abstract: After the annexation of Crimea in 2014, many 
proposed that this state-generated, ethnically loaded 
“nationalist boost” enhanced the state’s legitimacy 
by replacing the previous social contract between the 
Russian state and the people. This article argues for a more 
nuanced understanding of nationalism in contemporary 
Russia by asking how exactly the state leadership has 
portrayed the Russian nation in 2012–2019. Analyzing 
presidential speeches in this period, the article traces 
three distinctive but closely interconnected narratives 
of “Russianness”: the narrative of the victorious nation; 
the narrative of the moral nation; and the narrative of the 
multinational but ethnically hierarchical nation.
After Vladimir Putin began his third term as Russian President in 2012, and in particular following the annexation of the Crimean peninsula 
in the spring of 2014, media and, to some extent, scholarly analyses have 
turned to nationalism to explain the seemingly abrupt change in Russian 
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 politics.1 However, nationalism as a label does not sufficiently illuminate the self-presentation of the Russian state because it is a concept of several—
even conflicting—meanings that often remain undefined. Moreover, the 
purely instrumentalist interpretation of the concept fails to cover the full 
complexity of nationalism as a source of legitimacy for a political actor. 
In order to add an original and empirically tested argument to the schol-
arly discussion, the current article sets out to analyze references made to 
the nation in presidential discourse over the past eight years, that is, after 
the “wave of nationalism” hit the shore. It explains how the Russian state 
leadership has formulated its nationalist argument in 2012–2019 by asking 
what constitutes “Russianness” in the narratives produced by the president, 
and who, on those accounts, belongs to the nation? With the help of the 
scholarly literature, I contextualize this argument by discussing key policy 
shifts and societal attitudes related to the narratives.
The past and present of Russian nationalism(s) remains a well-stud-
ied theme. Scholars have focused, among other topics, on ethnic Russian 
nationalism and radical nationalist movements in Russian history,2 state 
nationalism as a consolidating policy,3 and the role of memory politics 
and media in the nation-building process.4 In many of these studies, an 
overarching theme has been the tension between state nationalism and 
“bottom-up” nationalism. Helge Blakkisrud and Pål Kolstø, leaders of 
the extensive research project NEORUSS, note that ”a ‘nationalist turn’ 
in Russian state policy makes sense only if we can also assume that there 
exists a pool of nationalist sentiment in the Russian population the rulers 
believe they can tap into,”5 a view endorsed in this article. According to 
1 See, for example, Richard Arnold. “Surveys Show Russian Nationalism Is On the Rise.” The 
Washington Post. May 30, 2016, At https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/
wp/2016/05/30/surveys-show-russian-nationalism-is-on-the-rise-this-explains-a-lot-about-
the-countrys-foreign-and-domestic-politics/, accessed September 17, 2019; Charles Clover. 
“The Return of Russian Nationalism.” Financial Times. October 13, 2017, At https://www.
ft.com/content/edb595d8-aeba-11e7-beba-5521c713abf4, accessed September 17, 2019.
2 Robert Horvath. 2005. The Legacy of Soviet Dissent: Dissidents, Democratisation and Radi-
cal Nationalism in Russia. Oxon: Routledge; Thomas Parland. 2005. The Extreme Nationalist 
Threat in Russia: The Growing Influence of Western Rightist Ideas. Oxon: Routledge.
3 Yitzhak M. Brudny. 1998. Reinventing Russia: Russian Nationalism and the Soviet State, 
1953–1991. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; Marléne Laruelle. 2009. In the 
Name of the Nation: Nationalism and Politics in Contemporary Russia. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan.
4 Olga Malinova. 2015. Aktual’noe proshloe. Simvolicheskaia politika vlastvuiushchei elity i 
dilemmy rossiiskoi identichnosti. [Current Past. The Symbolic Policy of the Ruling Elite and 
the Dilemmas of Russian Identity.] Moscow: ROSSPEN; Olga Malinova. 2017. “Political 
Uses of the Great Patriotic War in Post-Soviet Russia from Yeltsin to Putin.” In Julie Fedor, 
Markku Kangaspuro, Jussi Lassila and Tatiana Zhurzhenko, eds., War and Memory in Rus-
sia, Ukraine and Belarus. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan Memory Studies; Stephen Hutchings 
and Vera Tolz. 2015. Nation, Ethnicity and Race on Russian Television: Mediating Post-So-
viet Difference. Oxon: Routledge.
5 Pål Kolstø and Helge Blakkisrud. 2018. “Introduction.” In Pål Kolstø and Helge Blakkis-
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Luke March, in order to study nationalism in Russia in a holistic manner, 
research considering both the “ideational influence of nationalism and 
policy contents of its proponents” is needed.6 The “influence” of the narra-
tives remains outside the scope of this article, but the way in which these 
narratives are constructed reflects the state actors’ reasoning as well as their 
assumptions about popular moods.  
The term “social contract” has often been used when analyzing 
regime legitimacy in post-Soviet Russia.7 The contract was seriously 
tested in 2011–2012, when tens of thousands of Russian citizens gathered 
to protest against Vladimir Putin’s plans to return to the presidency. As a 
result, after Putin’s third term as president began in 2012, the state authori-
ties not only limited possibilities for political contention in the public space 
and in the media but also sought to appeal to the conservative part of the 
society by promoting traditional, “spiritual-moral” values as the core of 
Russian national identity. Simultaneously, efforts to connect these values 
to national security intensified.8 This change in politics, often described 
as an “authoritarian” or “conservative turn,”9 serves as the start of this 
study’s time frame: it focuses on state nationalism after that turn, which 
encompasses another watershed, the annexation of Crimea in the spring of 
2014. The annexation created a wave of patriotism that many interpreted 
as a new form of the social contract: on this view, instead of economic 
security, the people were given a “boost” of nationalist great-powerness in 
exchange for loyalty to the state in a time of a crisis.10 However, “increas-
ing” nationalism in order to enhance the legitimacy of the incumbent is a 
risky strategy, the potential success of which does not necessarily endure.
Moreover, as Henry E. Hale et al. argue, Russia’s political system 
rud, eds., Russia Before and After Crimea: Nationalism and Identity, 2010–17. Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 6–7.
6 Luke March. 2018. “Nationalism.” In Andrei P. Tsygankov, ed., Routledge Handbook of 
Russian Foreign Policy. London and New York: Routledge Handbooks, 95.
7 Aleksey Makarkin. 2011. “The Russian Social Contract and Regime Legitimacy.” Interna-
tional Affairs 87: 6: 1459–74.
8 Jardar Østbø. 2017. “Securitizing ‘Spiritual-Moral Values’ in Russia.” Post-Soviet Affairs 
33: 3: 200–216, 202.
9 Mikhail Suslov and Dmitry Uzlaner. 2019. “Dilemmas and Paradoxes of Contemporary Rus-
sian Conservatism: Introduction.” In Mikhail Suslov and Dmitry Uzlaner, eds., Contemporary 
Russian Conservatism. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 3–35; Magnus Feldmann and Honorata 
Mazepus. 2018. “State-Society Relations and the Sources of Support for the Putin Regime: 
Bridging Political Culture and Social Contract Theory.” East European Politics 34:1: 57–76.
10 Emil A. Pain and Lev D. Gudkov. 2014. “Beseda na temu: ‘V ozhidanii chuda: rossiiskoe 
obshchestvo posle krymskikh sobytii.” [Discussion on the Topic: ‘Waiting for a Miracle: 
Russian Society after the Crimean Events’]. Politicheskaia kontseptologiia 1; Eduard Ponarin 
and Mihail Komin. 2018. “The Russian Elite’s Imperial Nationalism and the Russian Soci-
ety: The Emergence of a Grand Consensus.” Sociology Compass 12: 12; Yuri Teper. 2018. 
“Kremlin’s Post-2012 National Policies: Encountering the Merits and Perils of Identity-Based 
Social Contract.” In Pål Kolstø and Helge Blakkisrud, eds., Russia Before and After Crimea. 
Nationalism and Identity, 2010–17. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 68.
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should be understood as inherently dynamic. The Kremlin employs both 
structural and ideational improvisation, and this process by no means 
reached its end after the “Crimean consensus.”11 In a similar vein, Magnus 
Feldmann and Honorata Mazepus point out that the social contract can 
be re-negotiated.12 As of the time of writing, it is clear that even if the 
majority of Russians still support the annexation of Crimea, the “patriotic 
boost” no longer serves as a significant source of legitimacy for the current 
leadership. Indeed, challenges related to state legitimacy have become 
even more acute in recent years, as socio-economic problems, corruption, 
and electoral fraud have triggered widespread protests. In the near future, 
the repercussions of the global Covid-19 pandemic will exacerbate these 
challenges. The process of “re-negotiating” the social contract between the 
state and the people is not over in contemporary Russia; by analyzing the 
narratives of the nation produced by the political leadership, we can gain 
some insight into the forms it may take in the future.
Political Narratives as a Way to Generate Meaning
The article draws on critical nationalism studies that treat the nation as a 
result of a deliberate construction process. As Yitzhak M. Brudny points 
out, shared beliefs about a nation’s distinctive origins, culture, and history, 
among other things, are not immutable.13 These beliefs are also subject to 
manipulation. To a large extent, the construction of a nation is innately 
political, which is why I have found John Breuilly’s concept of nationalism 
as an argument useful. The nationalist argument consists of three assump-
tions: that there exists a nation with an explicit character; that the interests 
of this nation take priority over those of other nations; and that the nation 
must be as independent as possible.14 Thus, I approach state-produced 
narratives on “Russianness” as a means of formulating and defending the 
nationalist argument. It is important to study this process because it has 
real political implications: nationalist discourses create the conditions for 
domestic and foreign policy decisions and maintain boundaries that recog-
nize those who belong and exclude the Others.15
Nationalist ideologies, like any ideologies, aim to become “common 
sense”—unnoticed, naturalized knowledge. This process takes place via 
language. Political actors often rely on the narrative form, since it is 
embraced by the public as a natural way of thinking.16 This article adopts 
11 Henry E. Hale, Maria Lipman and Nikolay Petrov. 2019. “Russia’s Regime-on-the-Move.” 
Russian Politics 4, 168–95.  
12 Feldmann and Mazepus, “State-Society Relations,” 66.
13 Brudny, Reinventing Russia, 5.
14 John Breuilly. 1994. Nationalism and the State. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
2–3.
15 Vera Tolz. 2001. Russia: Inventing the Nation. London: Arnold Publishers, 236.
16  Shaul R. Shenhav. 2006. “Political Narratives and Political Reality.” International Political 
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a minimal definition of narrative, understanding it as a socially produced 
account of events that contains aspects of temporality and causality.17 
Narratives are means to tell about experiences of the past and link them to 
the present in a meaningful way, so whether the narratives are “true” is less 
important than whether they are embraced by the people.18 Public narra-
tives of the nation, produced by the political leadership, are understood as 
stories told to the people about their shared characteristics that emphasize 
selected historical continua. 
For the purposes of this article, a set of 35 presidential addresses 
from the years 2012–2019 was collected for close reading. The selection 
includes the president’s annual addresses to the Federal Assembly of the 
Russian Federation,19 which have served, since 2014, as strategic planning 
documents for the country;20 addresses to the annual Valdai discussion 
forum (from the year 2013 onwards, when forum discussions became 
public); greetings at the annual Victory Day Parade; the speech given on 
the day of the annexation of Crimea in 2014, as well as the brief commem-
orative remarks made on the anniversary of the annexation in each 
subsequent year; and speeches delivered at the festivities for the Day of 
National Unity. The material encompasses both speeches outlining Russian 
state policy and addresses of a more ceremonial character that were given 
on occasions emphasizing national unity. The criteria for selection were 
that the speeches were widely reported in the domestic media and served 
a slightly different function from any other speech in the sample. Political 
leaders shape their message to their audience, so the goal was to map the 
main contents of the narratives that emerge in various settings. Russia’s 
political system is highly president-centric both in legislative terms and in 
practice, and in this article, the president is understood as the embodiment 
of the highest political power in Russia.
In order to answer the main research question—how the Russian 
state leadership has formulated the nationalist argument in 2012–2019—
the primary textual material was subjected to qualitative content analysis. 
The primary material was read in Russian, searching for specific references 
to the Russian nation (russkii/rossiiskii narod/natsiia), to “us” as a nation, 
or to “our” national character. Most often those were excerpts in which the 
president described “us” Russians in a certain way, portrayed the Russian 
Science Review 27: 3: 245–62, 250; Edwin Bacon. 2012. “Public Political Narratives: De-
veloping a Neglected Source through the Exploratory Case of Russia in the Putin-Medvedev 
era.” Political Studies 60: 768–86, 768.
17 Anna De Fina. 2017. “Narrative Analysis.” In Ruth Wodak and Bernhard Forchtner, eds., 
The Routledge Handbook of Language and Politics. London and New York: Routledge, 234.
18 Shenhav, “Political Narratives,” 246.
19 In December 2017, the presidential administration postponed the address until March 2018.
20 2014. Federal’nyi zakon No 172-FZ ‘O strategicheskom planirovanii v Rossiiskoi Feder-
atsii [Federal Law “On the Strategic planning of the Russian Federation”], At http://www.
kremlin.ru/acts/bank/38630, accessed November 19, 2019, chapter 3: 11/3.
522                             Demokratizatsiya 28:4 (Fall 2020)
nation in general terms or in comparison to its Others, or depicted the 
history of the nation. In analyzing the references, words and expressions 
that appeared particularly frequently were taken into account. However, 
no statistics were produced, nor were the meaning units quantitatively 
grouped, because it was possible to process the material manually. The 
references were organized into thematic categories depending on the 
temporal and causal ways in which the nation was defined. This produced 
three distinct narratives. This is not to say that these are the only possible 
narratives, nor that they are consistent and univocal throughout time, but 
taken together, they portray the explicit character of the Russian nation as 
expressed by state leadership. 
Narrative of the Multinational Nation 
In post-Soviet Russia, striking a balance between (broadly understood) 
ethnic and civic nation-building strategies has been a key challenge. 
From the authorities’ viewpoint, Russia’s ethno-federal structure has 
complicated civic nation-building, but ethnic variants cannot be openly 
endorsed because of their potential to encourage ethnic tensions, separat-
ism, and disintegration.21 Partly for this reason, Boris Yeltsin, despite his 
emphasis on the civic vocabulary and the interpretation of Russians as “a 
multinational nation” (mnogonatsional’nyi narod), took an imperial view 
of ethnic Russians as the most important, “state-forming” (gosudarstvoo-
brasuyushchey) nation of the country.22 These concepts feature in several 
key documents, such as the 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation 
and the 1996 Concept on Nationalities policy.23 As Oxana Shevel shows, 
the ambivalence between the concept of multinationality and the “special 
role” of ethnic Russians both in the Russian Federation and in the former 
Soviet Union persisted during Putin’s and Dmitri Medvedev’s presidential 
terms.24
Indeed, Putin has emphasized “multinationality”—in the sense of 
ethnic and confessional diversity—as one of the most consistent character-
istics of the Russian nation since the beginning of 2012, when he published 
a series of newspaper articles as part of his presidential campaign. In one 
21 See, for example, Oxana Shevel. 2011. “Russian Nation-Building from Yel’tsin to Med-
vedev: Ethnic, Civic or Purposefully Ambiguous?” Europe-Asia Studies 63: 2: 179–202.
22 The view of Russians as a state-forming nation gained popularity in the Russian Empire 
by the beginning of the twentieth century. Aleksei Miller. 2012. ”Istoriia poniatiia natsiia v 
Rossii.” [History of the Concept of Nation in Russia]. In Aleksei Miller et al., eds., Poniatiia 
o Rossii: K istoricheskoi semantike imperskogo perioda [Concepts on Russia: On Historical 
Semantics of the Imperial Period]. Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 7–49, 48.
23 Garant-Internet. n.d. Constitution of the Russian Federation, At http://www.constitution.ru/
en/10003000-01.htm, accessed November 11, 2019; J. Paul Goode. 2019. “Russia’s Ministry 
of Ambivalence: The Failure of Civic Nation-Building in Post-Soviet Russia.” Post-Soviet 
Affairs 35: 2: 140–160, 149.
24 Shevel, “Russian Nation-Building,” 189–90.
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of the texts, focusing explicitly on nationality politics, Putin explained his 
vision of multinationality as a crucial part of Russian statehood: “Historical 
Russia is not an ethnic state, nor is it an American ‘melting pot’ […] Russia 
developed in the course of centuries as a multinational state.”25 
In the same article, Putin stressed the view of ethnic Russians as a 
state-forming nation whose mission is to unite the civilization. Later in 
2012, Putin again presented multinationality as an inherent characteris-
tic both of the Russian state and its people—it is Russia’s “strength and 
beauty.”26 At the Valdai forum in 2013, Putin explained that “polycultural” 
and multi-ethnic features (polikul’turnost’, polietnichnost’) live in “our 
historical consciousness” and that questioning “our multi-ethnic character 
[…] means that we are starting to destroy our genetic code.”27
With these references to multinationality, the temporal and causal 
aspects of a certain narrative begin to take shape. In an article written for 
the presidential campaign, Putin described the origins of the Day of the 
National Unity, a national holiday to commemorate the end of the “Time 
of Troubles”—or the Polish invasion of Moscow—in 1612, stating that it 
celebrates a moment when estates and nationalities realized themselves as 
one people. He added: “We can rightfully consider this holiday the birth-
day of our civic nation (rozhdeniya nashey grazhdanskoy natsii).”28 Putin 
returned to this theme on the Day of National Unity in 2014:
Having formed a people’s militia, they [people of 
different nationalities and religions] liberated Moscow 
from invaders […]. More than four centuries have 
passed since then, but the dramatic events of that time 
remain an eternal historical lesson for us, a warning for 
all generations, a rule for us.29
Throughout the period under study, multinationality recurs as a “histor-
ical” characteristic of the Russian nation, often connected to loyalty to 
the Motherland and patriotism. The combination of these features, the 
25 Vladimir Putin. 2012. “Rossiia: natsional’nyi vopros” [Russia: The National Question]. 
Nezavisimaya gazeta, January 23, 2012, At http://www.ng.ru/politics/2012-01-23/1_national.
html, accessed September 4, 2019. Translations from Russian by the author.
26 Vladimir Putin. 2012. “Poslanie prezidenta Federal’nomu Sobraniiu” [Presidential Address 
to the Federal Assembly]. Kremlin.ru. December 12, 2012, At http://kremlin.ru/events/pres-
ident/news/17118, accessed November 11, 2019.
27 Vladimir Putin. 2013. “Zasedanie mezhdunarodnogo diskussionnogo kluba ‘Valdai.’” [The 
Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club]. Kremlin.ru. September 19, 2013, At 
http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19243, accessed November 11, 2019.
28 Putin, “Rossiia: natsional’nyi vopros.”
29 Vladimir Putin. 2014. “Priem po sluchaiu Dnia narodnogo edinstva” [Reception of the 
Day of the National Unity]. Kremlin.ru. November 4, 2014, At http://www.kremlin.ru/events/
president/news/46916, accessed November 11, 2019.
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narrative suggests, has ensured Russia’s survival in the times of conflict. 
As will be discussed further in this article, presidential discourse often 
deploys parallels between events in the past and those in the present. The 
Day of National Unity is a case in point. Edwin Bacon notes that when the 
new holiday was established in 2005, films and television documentaries 
likened the “Time of Troubles” in the seventeenth century to the 1990s in 
Russia: “The implication was that just as the Romanov dynasty brought 
long-term stability in 1612, so the Putin regime brought long-term stability 
after the chaos of the Yeltsin years.”30 Thus, one of the main narratives of 
“Russianness” reads as follows: the historical unity of the multinational 
Russian nation was born in 1612, when the people organized to fight the 
foreign enemy. Since then, the unity of the multinational nation has been 
tested in several conflicts in which there was an external threat, including 
the Second World War, but it has persisted and remains Russia’s strength 
to this day. The inherent multinational character of the Russian nation 
guarantees the harmonious coexistence of various nationalities within the 
Russian state and makes it unique in relation to other nations, such as the 
Western European nations.
Edwin Bacon describes subplots as alternative interpretations told by 
the regime itself. They provide flexibility to the actual narrative, as they 
can be employed simultaneously, but also allow future developments in 
alternative directions.31 Bacon’s concept of a subplot helps to analyze the 
“unique role” of ethnic Russians within the narrative of the multinational 
nation, often explained in the presidential discourse as a feature uniting 
“the civilization”:
We must treasure the unique experience passed on to 
us by our forefathers. For centuries—from the very 
beginning—Russia developed as a multi-ethnic nation, 
a state-civilisation held together by the Russian people 
(skreplennoe russkim narodom), the Russian language 
and Russian culture, which are native to all of us, which 
unite us and prevent us from dissolving in this diverse 
world.32 
Thus, the narrative is presented as ethnically inclusive, but it simulta-
neously embraces the idea of a certain type of ethnic hierarchy. In other 
words, all nationalities belong to the narrative of the multinational nation, 
but ethnic Russians have a special—that is, more important—role. The 
subplot within the narrative of the multinational nation stresses the decisive 
30 Bacon, “Public Political Narratives,” 779.
31 Ibid., 780–81.
32 Putin, “Poslanie prezidenta.” 
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role of ethnic Russians in the religious and cultural history of the country. 
In contemporary contexts, the view of Russian ethnicity as “first among 
equals” has been reinforced both by representatives of the establishment 
and by the country’s highest-level leadership.33 
Despite the emphasis on multinationality, the state apparatus has 
tested alternative approaches as well. In May 2012, as Stephen Hutchings 
and Vera Tolz have shown, an anti-migrant campaign began on federal 
TV: state-aligned broadcasters portrayed immigration, particularly Islamic 
immigration, as a threat to Russia’s sovereignty, security, and identity.34 
By the end of 2013, the Kremlin-endorsed campaign had contributed to 
outbreaks of violent radical nationalism on the streets of Moscow suburbs, 
and the people expressed distrust in the state authorities’ ability to handle 
the situation. Xenophobic attitudes toward migrants were at a record 
high.35 During the campaign, Putin did not stress migration-related ques-
tions, but in October 2013, following an outbreak of violence, he addressed 
the issue in a speech to the Federal Assembly:
It [interethnic tension] is not provoked by representatives 
of particular nationalities, but by people devoid of culture 
and respect for traditions, both their own and those of 
others. […] Together we must rise to the challenge; we 
must protect interethnic peace and thus the unity of our 
society, the unity and integrity of the Russian state.36
By the end of 2013, the anti-migration campaign on TV had been toned 
down, while control of radical nationalist groups had increased. The Sochi 
Winter Olympics, the annexation of Crimea, and the war in Ukraine shifted 
the media’s attention elsewhere, affecting public opinion: xenophobic atti-
tudes began to decrease after spring 2014.37
The most significant shift in this narrative took place in 2014. Until 
then, the emphasis on historical multinationality had outweighed the 
33 Helge Blakkisrud. 2016. “Blurring the Boundary between Civic and Ethnic: The Kremlin’s 
New Approach to National Identity under Putin’s Third Term.” In Pål Kolstø and Helge 
Blakkisrud, eds., The New Russian Nationalism: Imperialism, Ethnicity and Authoritarianism 
2000–2015. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 254–55; Hutchings and Tolz, Nation, 
Ethnicity and Race, 223.
34 Hutchings and Tolz, Nation, Ethnicity and Race, 239–40.
35 Karina Pipiya. 2016. Intolerantnost’ i ksenofobiia [Intolerance and Xenophobia.], At http://
www.levada.ru/2016/10/11/intolerantnost-i-ksenofobiya, accessed June 4, 2019.
36 Vladimir Putin. 2013. “Poslanie prezidenta Federal’nomu Sobraniiu.” [Presidential Address 
to the Federal Assembly]. Kremlin.ru. December 12, 2013, At http://kremlin.ru/events/pres-
ident/news/19825, accessed November 11, 2019.
37 Levada Center. 2016. Soiuzniki i ‘vragi’ Rossii. Evropeiskaia integratsiia [Allies and 
‘Enemies’ of Russia. European Integration], At http://www.levada.ru/2016/06/02/13400/, 
accessed June 4, 2019.
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references to ethnic Russianness in the presidential discourse. But in his 
speeches dealing with Crimea, Putin highlighted the ethnic connotation 
instead. In his March 2014 address, held after the referendum, he stressed 
“Russianness” as the decisive characteristic of the peninsula, saying, for 
example, that the residents of Crimea have always regarded it as “orig-
inally Russian land (iskonno russkaya zemlya).”38 In his speech to the 
Federal Assembly later that year, Putin reiterated that “our people” (nashi 
lyudi) are living in Crimea—and stated that the main motivation for the 
annexation was to defend their rights. Putin also referred to the Grand 
Prince of Kiev, Vladimir the Great, who was baptized there, and described 
Sevastopol as a holy place for “all of us.”39 
By linking the nation to the Orthodox tradition and constantly 
referring to it using a term with an ethnic connotation, Putin emphasized 
ethnic Russianness as the key frame for the annexation. Yuri Teper inter-
preted this as “a remarkable ethno-national shift” in the official identity 
discourse: after a long and rather stable emphasis on statist nation-building, 
the annexation of Crimea marked the moment that the nation became the 
primary reference point for constructing Russianness.40 But in the years 
that followed, the “ethno-national” tone no longer dominated Putin’s 
speeches. Instead, the historical multinationality of the Russian nation 
figured prominently in presidential discourse until the very end of the 
period under study.41 Sofia Tipaldou and Philipp Casula note that “the 
people” to whom state actors appealed in 2014 was “a much more unstable, 
slippery, and problematic construct” than, for example, during the Chechen 
war, because Ukrainians are considered a brotherly nation. They posit that 
for this reason, the official discourse utilized “the populist and inclusionary 
elements” of nationalism.42 Moreover, I would suggest that the emphasis 
on ethnic Russianness as a historically “unifying” feature of the nation has 
served as a co-existing plot within the narrative of the multinational nation, 
both during and after the annexation of Crimea.
In this regard, the conceptual choices are telling. For example, 
38 Vladimir Putin. 2014(b). “Obrashchenie prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii.” [Address 
by the President of Russian Federation]. Kremlin.ru. March 18, 2014, At http://kremlin.ru/
events/president/news/20603, accessed November 11, 2019.
39 Vladimir Putin. 2014(c). ”Poslanie prezidenta Federal’nomu Sobraniyu.” [Presidential Ad-
dress to the Federal Assembly]. Kremlin.ru. December 4, 2014, At http://kremlin.ru/events/
president/news/47173, accessed November 11, 2019.
40 Yuri Teper. 2016. “Official Russian Identity Discourse in Light of the Annexation of 
Crimea: National or Imperial?” Post-Soviet Affairs, 32:4: 378–96, 392–393.
41 Vladimir Putin. 2018. “Priem po sluchayu Dnia narodnogo edinstva” [Reception of the Day 
of the National Unity]. Kremlin.ru. November 4, 2018, At http://kremlin.ru/events/president/
news/59043, accessed November 4, 2019; Vladimir Putin. 2019. “Priem po sluchayu Dnia 
narodnogo edinstva” [Reception of the Day of the National Unity]. Kremlin.ru. November 4, 
2019, At http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/61963, accessed November 4, 2019.
42 Sofia Tipaldou and Philipp Casula. 2019. “Russian Nationalism Shifting: The Role of 
Populism Since the Annexation of Crimea.” Demokratizatsiya, 27:3 (Summer 2019): 351.
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throughout his Crimea speech, Putin deployed the term russkii.43 Marlène 
Laruelle has noted that the widespread interpretation that russkii refers to 
linguistic and ethnic Russians, whereas rossiiskii encompasses citizens 
of the Russian Federation regardless of their ethnicity, is actually too 
narrow of a view on the matter. She posits that the term russkii reinforces 
the historical unity of the Eastern Slavs and emphasizes the “messianic” 
destiny of Russia.44 Kolstø and Blakkisrud suggest that by using the two 
concepts interchangeably, the Kremlin wishes to eradicate the difference 
between russkii and rossiiskii, and thus make Russia into a more “normal” 
nation-state.45 In the material of this study, Putin does not show sensitivity 
to these concepts in the sense of using them systematically. The motivation 
for the inconsistency (and the extent to which it is a deliberate choice) 
can be debated, but it is clear that russkii in the presidential discourse is a 
cultural-linguistic term rather than a narrow ethno-national one:
I recall one of my meetings with veterans. There were 
people of different nationalities: Tatars, Ukrainians, 
Georgians, and Russians, of course. One of the veterans, 
not a Russian by nationality, said, “For the whole world, 
we are one people, we are Russians (my odin narod, my 
russkie).” That’s how it was during the war, and that’s 
how it has always been.46
The identity discourses concerning the annexation of Crimea mostly 
targeted domestic audiences.47 Yet the narrative of the multinational nation 
also has a strong foreign policy aspect. In the presidential discourse, 
multinationality is a sustainable policy, whereas the Western alternative, 
multiculturalism, is condemned. As early as January 2012, Putin stated that 
multiculturalism leads to a situation where people risk losing their national 
identity, and thus portends a crisis for European nation-states. He went on 
to say that Russia’s situation is “principally different.”48 Five years later, he 
stated that “on a global scale, the creation of mono-ethnic states (mononat-
sional’noe gosudarstvo) is not a panacea against possible conflicts, but just 
the opposite.”49 Putin portrayed the mono-national state, which is prone to 
43 Putin, “Obrashchenie prezidenta.”
44 Marléne Laruelle. 2016. “Misinterpreting Nationalism: Why Russkii is Not a Sign of 
Ethnonationalism.” PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo 416, At http://www.ponarseurasia.org/
node/8218, accessed November 19, 2019.
45 Kolstø and Blakkisrud, “Introduction,” 9.
46 Putin, “Poslanie prezidenta” (2012).
47 Teper, “Official Russian Identity,” 393.
48 Putin, “Rossiia: natsional’nyi vopros.”
49 Vladimir Putin. 2017. “Zasedanie mezhdunarodnogo diskussionnogo kluba ‘Valdai’.” [The 
Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club]. Kremlin.ru. October 19, 2017, At http://
kremlin.ru/events/president/news/55882, accessed November 11, 2019.
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conflicts, as an antithesis to the multinational state, which today’s Russia 
represents. In short, the multiculturalism adopted by the Western countries 
is perceived in the presidential discourse as a failure, whereas the multi-
nationality of the Russian state results from a centuries-old tradition of 
“ensuring diversity in unity” and is, therefore, more durable and balanced.
During the period under study, a political attempt to “clarify” the key 
concept of the narrative of the multinational nation surfaced. In a meeting 
of the Council for Ethnic Relations in 2016, the president endorsed the idea 
of drafting a law on the Russian nation (zakon o rossiiskoi natsii).50 One of 
the initiators of the idea, Vyacheslav Mikhailov, explained that a clear defi-
nition would reduce confusion stemming from two possible interpretations 
of the concept of nation (natsiia): a civic entity and an ethnicity.51 Both 
Mikhailov and another key figure behind the initiative, Valeri Tishkov, 
served as nationalities minister in the 1990s.52 An amendment they pursued 
was adopted in December 2018. Today, the Strategy of Nationalities 
Policy defines “the multinational people of the Russian Federation (the 
Russian nation)” as “a community of free equal citizens of the Russian 
Federation of various ethnic, religious, social and other affiliations, with 
civic consciousness (obladayushchih grazhdanskim samosoznaniem).”53 
It remains to be seen whether this distinctively civic but still rather vague 
definition will affect the actual nationalities policy, especially since the 
state authorities have simultaneously adopted increasingly assimilative 
measures regarding, for instance, minority languages.54 
The popularity of the narrative of the multinational nation remains 
difficult to assess, partly because the fear of separatism has constrained the 
public discussion on ethnic minorities’ rights or inter-ethnic tensions within 
society. Nor have those topics been covered in presidential addresses since 
the end of 2013. Recent opinion polls demonstrate a rise in xenophobic 
attitudes among Russians after 2017,55 which portends future challenges 
50 2016. “Zasedanie Soveta po mezhnatsional’nym otnosheniiam” [Meeting of the Council for 
Ethnic Relations]. Kremlin.ru. October 31, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53173, 
accessed May 5, 2020.
51 Georgii Neyaskin. 2018. “’Ni odna strana ne mozhet bez ideologii.’ Interv’iu s avtorom 
idei uzakonit’ rossiiskuiu natsiiu.“ [‘No Country Can Be without an Ideology.’ An Interview 
with an Author of the Idea to Legalize the Russian Nation]. Republic.ru, November 2, 2018, 
At https://republic.ru/posts/75657, accessed May 5, 2020.
52 Goode, “Russia’s Ministry of Ambivalence,“ 150–52.
53 2018. “Podpisan Ukaz o vnesenii izmenenii v Strategiiu gosudarstvennoi natsional’noi 
politiki na period do 2025 goda” [A Decree to Amend the Strategy of Nationalities Policy 
until 2025 was Signed]. Kremlin.ru. December 7, 2018, At http://kremlin.ru/acts/news/59348, 
accessed May 5, 2020, chapter 6.
54 Konstantin Zamyatin. 2016. “Russian Political Regime Change and Strategies of Diversity 
Management: From a Multinational Federation towards a Nation-State.” Journal on Ethnop-
olitics and Minority Issues in Europe 15: 1: 19–49, 44–45.
55 Levada Center. 2019. Monitoring ksenofobskikh nastroenii [Monitoring of the xenophobic 
attitudes] At https://www.levada.ru/2019/09/18/monitoring-ksenofobskih-nastroenij-2/, ac-
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to the narrative of the multinational nation. Stressing the primacy of ethnic 
Russianness may have unwanted effects because of the lack of agreement 
regarding to whom it actually refers. The simultaneous process of redefin-
ing key concepts in official policy documents according to distinctively 
civic language suggests that the existing conceptual and strategic ambi-
guity will prevail.
Narrative of the Victorious Nation 
As the narrative of the multinational nation shows, the idea of a shared past 
helps to define the explicit character of the Russian nation. Referring to 
common history is a universal way to enhance feelings of belonging within 
a nation, hence why history is universally used—and abused—by politi-
cians for nation-building purposes. In post-Soviet Russia, all state leaders 
have had to overcome the country’s complex role as the successor of the 
USSR, on one hand, and the absence of any widely-accepted “grand narra-
tive,” on the other. In the early 1990s, narratives of the past were harnessed 
to legitimate reforms, and the contrast between the totalitarian past and the 
democratic present was thus stressed. However, in early 2000s, the official 
narratives adopted the idea of a “thousand-year-long” Russian history to 
replace the perception of “old” and “new” Russia. At this stage, as Olga 
Malinova puts it, “the critical attitude to the Soviet past was replaced by 
its selective appropriation.”56
The year 2012, dubbed the “Year of History,” marked an intensifi-
cation of political uses of the past in presidential discourse. According to 
Malinova, the number of historical references in the Russian presidential 
discourse began to grow significantly after 2012, when allusions to pre-So-
viet Russian history also became more commonplace. The role of history in 
society gained considerable attention: new museums, projects, and policies 
were introduced. In December, Putin signed a decree to found Russia’s War 
History Society, headed by Minister of Culture Vladimir Medinskii.57 In 
February of the following year, Putin presented the idea of a single history 
textbook to canonize history education, an idea that eventually evolved 
into a Unified History Concept to guide history teaching in the country.58 
Today, history features strongly in Russian political discourse; the ruling 
elite considers the construction of the past to be one of its political tasks.59 
In his speech to the Federal Assembly in December 2012, Putin 
reminded the audience of “the simple truth that Russia did not begin 
in 1917, or even in 1991, but rather, […] we have a common, continuous 
cessed November 19, 2019.
56 Malinova, “Political Uses,” 45–46.
57 Order #1710, At https://rvio.histrf.ru/officially/ukaz-1710, accessed April 28, 2020.
58 Nikolai Gorodetskii. “Kontseptsiia odna, uchebnikov mnogo.” August 27, 2014, At https://
www.gazeta.ru/science/2014/08/27_a_6191721.shtml, accessed September 15, 2020.
59 Malinova, Aktual’noe proshloe, 130–36; Malinova, “Political Uses,” 47, 50–53.
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history spanning over one thousand years, and we must rely on it to find 
inner strength and purpose in our national development.”60 At the Valdai 
forum in 2013, Putin stated that “we must be proud of our history, and we 
have things to be proud of. Our entire, uncensored history must be a part 
of Russian identity.”61 Despite these words, the state leadership remains 
extremely selective in its use of the shared past. 
Undoubtedly the most important event in the shared past of the 
Russian nation is the victory over Nazi Germany in the Second World 
War, which in Russia is known as the Great Patriotic War. The victory 
has become the formative event in the history of the nation: it made “us” 
what “we” are today. This view was expressed as early as 2010, when 
president Dmitri Medvedev stated on the 65th anniversary of the Victory 
that “that war made us a strong nation.”62 The political myth of the war 
connects sacrifice and heroism, for without one, there cannot be the other. 
On Victory Day (May 9), celebrations take place across the country, and a 
military parade is held on Red Square in Moscow. In 2015, the 70th anniver-
sary of the victory, the parade was the largest ever in terms of participants 
and military equipment. No significant scaling-down has taken place in 
subsequent years. In the summer of 2019, the presidential administration 
announced that the year 2020 would be a “Year of Memory and Glory” 
to celebrate the 75th anniversary of the victory.63 Referring to this, Putin 
reminded listeners in November 2019 that “we prepare to celebrate our 
sacred date (svyashchennuiu dlia nas datu).”64 Public celebrations of the 
victory, as well as the vast resources channeled to state-associated histor-
ical organizations, museums, and events in recent years, keep the shared 
past vividly present in society.
Since 2012, Putin has ended his Victory Day speech with the greeting 
“Glory to the victorious nation!” every year except 2016 and 2018. Joseph 
Stalin coined the term “victorious nation” (narod-pobeditel’), or “the 
nation that wins/has won,” on the very first Victory Day in 1945. In the 
contemporary context, it stresses the victory as an eternal characteristic of 
the nation. For example, in May 2013, Putin described the victory as “the 
sound of a great bell that celebrates life without war, a sacred symbol of 
loyalty to our Motherland which lives in each of us.”65 
60 Putin, “Poslanie prezidenta” (2012).
61 Putin, “Zasedanie mezhdunarodnogo” (2013).
62 Dmitri Medvedev. “Dorogie veterany!” [Dear Veterans!]. Kremlin.ru, May 9, 2010, At 
http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/7685, accessed May 5, 2020.
63 “V Rossii 2020 god stanet Godom pamyati i slavy” [In Russia, the Year 2020 Will Become a 
Year of Memory and Glory]. RIA Novosti. July 8, 2019, At https://ria.ru/20190708/1556323142.
html, accessed November 20, 2019.
64 Putin, “Priem po sluchaiu” (2019).
65 Vladimir Putin. 2013. “Voennyi parad na Krasnoi ploshadi” [Military Parade on the Red 
Square]. Kremlin.ru. May 9, 2013, At http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/18089, ac-
cessed November 11, 2019.
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One of the key shifts in the discourse of the shared past takes place 
after 2014, when the “victorious nation” started to function as a parallel 
between the past and present. Olga Malinova has noted that in the context of 
international conflict, “the triumphalist narrative of the Great Patriotic War 
acquired a new dimension: it came to be used as a marker of post-Soviet 
imperialist identity and became closely associated with pro-Putin ‘patri-
otic’ attitudes.”66 My findings suggest that this shift was reinforced in the 
presidential discourse by stressing the similarities between “Russianness” 
past and present. For instance, in 2018, Putin described those marching on 
the Red Square parade as the “new generation of victors”67 (novoe poko-
lenie pobeditelei). In this way, the presidential discourse suggests that the 
memory of the war is “alive” and that the concept of the victorious nation 
also describes the nation living today.
Another way to mark this connection was the adoption of a minute 
of silence at the Victory Day ceremony in 2015. The gesture is primarily 
dedicated to the veterans of the Great Patriotic War, but Putin’s formulation 
connects them with contemporary war veterans by mentioning “those who 
did not return from the war.”68 According to Andrei Kolesnikov, the Kremlin 
pursues a “myth of permanent war” and borrows the Soviet discourse of a 
“fair, defensive, victorious, and preventive” war to frame Russia’s current 
wars.69 This becomes evident in Putin’s speeches after 2014. In the official 
foreign policy narrative, Russia’s military actions have always been and 
still are of a defensive nature.70 For example, when explaining the dynam-
ics of the new world order at the Valdai meeting in 2014, Putin reminded 
the audience that “we did not start this.”71 In September 2015, Russia 
embarked on military intervention in Syria, dubbed first and foremost 
a “preventive” action in the war against terrorism. Likewise, on Victory 
Day in 2016, prefacing his comments on terrorism, Putin said that “history 
lessons teach us that peace on this planet is not established by itself.” In 
the speech, the linkage between the soldiers of today and the soldiers of 
the past is clear (although Putin does not explicitly mention Syria): “Our 
soldiers and commanders have proven that they are worthy successors of 
66 Malinova, “Political Uses,” 46.
67 Vladimir Putin. 2018. “Voennyi parad na Krasnoi ploshchadi” [Military Parade on the 
Red Square]. Kremlin.ru, May 9, 2018, At http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/57436, 
accessed September 10, 2019.
68 This part of the speech has been similar in 2015, 2016, 2018 and 2019.
69 Andrei Kolesnikov. 2016. Do Russians Want War?, At http://carnegie.ru/2016/06/14/do-
russians-want-war/j1u8, accessed May 3, 2019.
70 See, for example, Vladimir Putin. 2018. “Poslanie prezidenta Federal’nomu Sobraniiu” 
[Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly]. Kremlin.ru. March 1, 2018, At http://kremlin.
ru/events/president/transcripts/messages/56957, accessed November 20, 2019.
71 Vladimir Putin. 2014. “Zasedanie mezhdunarodnogo diskussionnogo kluba ‘Valdai’.“ [The 
Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club]. Kremlin.ru. October 24, 2014, At http://
www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46860, accessed November 11, 2019.
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the Great Patriotic War heroes and that they protect the interests of Russia 
honorably.”72 
Thus, according to the narrative of the victorious nation, the Russian 
nation has, throughout its thousand-year-long history, had to defend itself 
against an external enemy, and has, since the triumph over the Polish 
invasion in the seventeenth century, always succeeded. The Great Patriotic 
War made the nation what it is today by unifying all Russians, regardless 
of their ethnicity, against the evil. But as international terrorism shows, 
the evil did not disappear, and peace is not self-preserving. This is why 
today’s generation needs to remember, respect, and defend the memory 
of the Great Victory. The generations of the past and the present share the 
same explicit character: they represent the “victorious nation” in a world 
that is constantly in a state of war between good and evil.
The annexation of Crimea in 2014 remains to be portrayed as 
correcting a mistake of the past.73 The majority of Russians perceive the 
annexation as a success, and after 2014, pride in the Russian military as 
well as the country’s influence in the world increased.74 The state author-
ities have made extensive use of the Crimea motif. The first anniversary 
of the annexation was marked by a large, festive event called “We are 
together” (My vmeste) in Moscow,75 and celebrations to mark the event 
have been organized annually since then. In 2019, Putin paid a visit to 
Simferopol’, where he stated that “the behavior of the Sevastopol’ and 
Crimean residents reminds me of the behavior of the Red Army soldiers 
in the tragic months of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War.”76 In 
the president’s speech, honorable actions in the present day can best be 
emphasized by drawing parallels with the most heroic actions of all time: 
the wartime deeds of the Soviet army and the Soviet people. In this regard, 
it is also interesting that Putin uses the terms “Soviet army” and “our army” 
interchangeably.
In 2017, Russia celebrated the centenary of the October Revolution, 
72 Vladimir Putin. 2016. “Voennyi parad na Krasnoi ploshchadi” [Military Parade on the 
Red Square]. Kremlin.ru. May 9, 2016, At http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/51888, 
accessed November 20, 2019.
73 Vladimir Putin. 2018. “Vladimir Putin posetil Sevastopol’” [Vladimir Putin Visited Sev-
astopol’]. Kremlin.ru. March 14, 2018, At http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/57063, 
accessed November 20, 2019; see also Teper, “Official Russian Identity,” 383.
74 Marharyta Fabrykant and Vladimir Magun. 2019. “Dynamics of National Pride Attitudes 
in Post-Soviet Russia, 1996–2015.” Nationalities Papers, 47:1: 20–37, 23–24.
75 Vladimir Putin. 2015. “Kontsert, posvyashchennyi vossoedineniiu Kryma i Sevastopolia 
s Rossiei” [Concert Dedicated to the Unification of Crimea and Sevastopol with Russia]. 
Kremlin.ru. May 18, 2015, At http://kremlin.ru/catalog/regions/CR/events/47878, accessed 
September 16, 2019.
76 Vladimir Putin. 2019. “Kontsert po sluchaiu pyatiletiia vossoedineniia Kryma s Rossiei” 
[Concert for the Fifth Anniversary of the Unification of Crimea with Russia]. Kremlin.ru. 
March 18, 2019, At http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/60096, accessed September 16, 
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the memory of which, even if by no means “censored” (numerous exhi-
bitions, books, and cultural events were dedicated to the revolution), 
proved difficult for the state leadership. Olga Malinova has explained that 
the Russian state cannot successfully build a new, consistent frame for 
the revolution because it completely rejects a “working through” of the 
traumas of the past.77 In the material collected for this paper, the president 
mentioned the revolution78 twice. The first mention came in 2016, when 
he declared that “Russian society in general needs an objective, honest 
and deep-reaching analysis of these events.”79 The following year, Putin 
reminded the audience at the Valdai forum that the revolution had had 
both negative and positive consequences, calling for “gradual and consis-
tent” evolution instead of “the destruction of statehood.”80 A year later, on 
the same occasion, Putin was asked about growing demands for change 
within Russian society. In the spring of 2017, a video by oppositional 
politician Aleksey Navalnyi on Prime Minister Medvedev’s properties 
had triggered widespread protest against corruption, and in the summer 
of 2018, there had been significant demonstrations nationwide against the 
planned pension reform. Simultaneously, sociological surveys reported 
on growing discontent and hopes for change in domestic politics. Putin’s 
answer was blunt: people everywhere, including in Russia, want change, 
but not “revolutionary changes”: “We are fed up with the revolutions of the 
twentieth century, and we’ve had enough of revolutionary changes even in 
recent history.”81 Thus, the state discourse perceives revolution per se as 
undesired and politicizes its memory by connecting it to present reforms.
During the years 2012–2019, several policy decisions were taken to 
guard the “correct” interpretations of the past, demonstrating the increased 
significance of the narrative of the victorious nation. For example, the state 
authorities defined the limits of the accepted forms of remembering the 
Great Patriotic War. In May 2014, Putin signed a law penalizing the reha-
bilitation of Nazism, the public desecration of symbols of Russian military 
glory, or the spreading of disrespectful information about the country’s 
77 Olga Malinova. 2018. “The Embarrassing Centenary: Reinterpretation of the 1917 Revo-
lution in the Official Historical Narrative of Post-Soviet Russia (1991–2017).” Nationalities 
Papers 46: 2: 272–89.
78 One of the conceptual innovations regarding the event was the name “Great Russian 
Revolution 1917,” which encompasses both the Menshevik revolution in February and the 
socialist revolution in October.
79 Vladimir Putin. 2016. “Poslanie prezidenta Federal’nomu Sobraniiu.” [Presidential Address 
to the Federal Assembly]. Kremlin.ru. December 1, 2016, At http://kremlin.ru/events/presi-
dent/news/53379, accessed November 11, 2019.
80 Putin, “Zasedanie mezhdunarodnogo” (2017).
81 Vladimir Putin. 2018. “Zasedanie diskussionnogo kluba ‘Valdai’” [The Meeting of the 
Valdai Discussion Club]. Kremlin.ru. October 18, 2018, At http://kremlin.ru/events/president/
news/58848, accessed November 20, 2019.
534                             Demokratizatsiya 28:4 (Fall 2020)
defense.82 The adoption of the law follows a logic that is pronounced in 
all state narratives: 
This is our common history and we need to treat it with 
respect. […] It is unacceptable to drag schisms, anger, 
resentment and bitterness of the past into our life today, 
and in pursuit of one’s own political and other interests to 
speculate on tragedies that concerned practically every 
family in Russia, no matter what side of the barricades 
our forebears were on. Let’s remember that we are a 
united people, one people, and we have one Russia (my 
edinyi narod, my odin narod, i Rossiia u nas odna).83
Belonging to the nation, in this sense, means remembering and respecting 
the experiences of the shared past. In May 2018, Putin noted that there have 
been attempts to falsify history, but “we will not allow this [to happen].”84 
In the presidential discourse, remembering the past has a morally binding 
aspect: it is the duty and the moral obligation of today’s people to recog-
nize their position in the chain of generations before them. Thus does the 
narrative of the victorious nation connect to the idea of patriotic loyalty.
Russian history is one of the most significant and persistent sources 
of national pride.85 For example, the Immortal Regiment event, which 
invites ordinary Russians to march on Victory Day with portraits of their 
relatives who took part in or were killed during the Great Patriotic War, 
has a positive public image. The narrative of the victorious nation seems 
to be intuitively accepted by the people, but the tendency of the state lead-
ership to connect the narrative to the conflicts of today may complicate 
its reception in the future. If military actions cannot credibly be framed 
as “defensive and victorious,” popular support for them may decrease. 
Growing expenditures abroad may start to look bad if domestic socio-eco-
nomic upgrades cannot be funded.
Narrative of the Moral Nation 
Throughout his presidential career, Vladimir Putin has occasionally 
referred to the shared values of the Russian nation. As early as 2007, Putin 
considered “the spiritual unity of the people and the moral values that 
unite us” to be just as important as the country’s political and economic 
82 Ivan Kurilla. 2014. “The Implications of Russia’s Law against the ‘Rehabilitation of Na-
zism.’” PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo 331 (August 2014), At http://www.ponarseurasia.org/
memo/201408_Kurilla, accessed September 16, 2019.
83 Putin, “Poslanie prezidenta” (2016).
84 Putin, “Voennyi parad” (2018). 
85 Fabrykant and Magun, “Dynamics of National Pride,” 33.
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stability.86 However, the content of those “moral values” has been in flux in 
post-Soviet Russia. At the beginning of Vladimir Putin’s third presidential 
term in 2012, the state had to answer to the fundamental challenge that 
the democracy demonstrations had posed. In the president’s address to the 
Federal Assembly in 2012, Putin announced a quest for “spiritual bonds” 
that would strengthen the country from within: 
Today, Russian society experiences a clear deficit of 
spiritual bonds: mercy, compassion, support and mutual 
assistance—a deficit of things that have always, at all 
times, made us stronger and more powerful, things that 
we have always been proud of.87 
In Putin’s parlance at the time, spiritual bonds were needed to increase 
societal stability. The following year, Putin began to emphasize the 
“traditional” features of the “national code.”88 This new emphasis in the 
presidential discourse signaled the state leadership’s desire to speak to 
the more conservative part of Russian society. The president’s belief that 
there was a “deficit” of spiritual bonds among Russians has, since 2013, 
transformed into a claim that Russians as a nation embrace traditional 
spiritual-moral values (dukhovno-nravstvennye tsennosti).89 In 2014, tradi-
tional values began to be cemented in key policy documents. The Strategy 
on National Security, confirmed by the president on December 31, 2015, 
explains that:
Traditional Russian spiritual and moral values include 
the priority of the spiritual over the material, protection 
of human life and of human rights and freedoms, 
the family, creative labor, service to the homeland, 
the norms of morals and morality, humanism, charity, 
fairness, mutual assistance, collectivism, the historical 
unity of the peoples of Russia, and the continuity of our 
motherland’s history.90
86 Vladimir Putin. 2007. “Poslanie prezidenta Federal’nomu Sobraniiu” [Annual Address to 
the Federal Assembly]. Kremlin.ru, April 26, 2007, At http://kremlin.ru/events/president/
transcripts/24203, accessed May 5, 2020.
87 Putin, “Poslanie prezidenta” (2012).
88 Putin, “Zasedanie mezhdunarodnogo” (2013); Putin, “Poslanie prezidenta” (2013).
89 Putin, “Obrashchenie prezidenta” (2014); Putin, “Priem po sluchaiu” (2019); Putin, “Po-
slanie prezidenta” (2018).
90 2015. Strategiia natsional’noi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Strategy of National 
Security of the Russian Federation], At http://www.rg.ru/2015/12/31/nac-bezopasnost-site-
dok.html, accessed November 11, 2019, Article 78.
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The presidential discourse portrays shared conservative values as the 
natural basis of the Russian nation and, in so doing, stresses the rights 
of the majority over the minority.91 In this way, a narrative supposed to 
enhance national unity simultaneously draws lines within the country by 
identifying the Others of the nation. In addition to the Strategy on National 
Security, the Foundations of State Cultural Policy applies the concept by 
stating that civil society is held together by shared values,92 suggesting 
that those who do not accept traditional values are not included in society. 
In the president’s discourse, the shared traditional values of the 
nation—in particular “spirituality” and patriotism—have a strong back-
ward-looking orientation. They enabled Russia’s survival after the Time 
of Troubles, in the Great Patriotic War, and in the face of the very real 
threat of civil war in the early 1990s.93 Thus, the narrative of moral nation 
is mutually reinforcing with the idea of victorious nation: it portrays the 
ideals for which the Russian people have struggled over the course of 
centuries. In the present day, patriotism has acquired yet another aspect 
in the presidential speech: it serves as a precondition for criticism in the 
political debate94 and as a consolidating basis for national politics.95 Putin 
has also called patriotism the only possible “uniting idea” of the Russian 
nation.96 In 2016, he described patriotism in this sense as a success, 
stating that “our people have united around patriotic values.”97 In the state 
discourse, patriotism means loyalty to the state and readiness to act for its 
benefit. But an expectation of patriotism from all Russians creates unity 
at the expense of those who remain critical of the state. Framing political 
opposition as non-patriotic serves to rhetorically exclude political oppo-
nents from the nation.
Another group excluded from “Russianness” on the basis of shared 
values are sexual and gender minorities. In presidential speeches, direct 
references to the topic have been rare, even though traditional family 
values are often stressed. In September 2013, Putin lamented that the West 
91 Putin, “Zasedanie mezhdunarodnogo” (2013); Vladimir Putin. 2015. “Zasedanie mezhdun-
arodnogo diskussionnogo kluba ‘Valdai’” [The Meeting of the Valdai International Discus-
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denies traditional “national, cultural, religious and even gender (polovoi)” 
identities when conducting policies that put big families and same-sex 
relations, as well as “faith in God and faith in Satan,” on the same level. On 
the same occasion, however, Putin denied that Russia would disrespect any 
rights of sexual minorities,98 even though he had recently signed a federal 
law that prohibited the dissemination of “gay propaganda” to minors, 
effectively making it impossible for sexual minorities to put forward any 
positive public message.99 Today, the question has taken on an international 
aspect: conservative circles in Russia use the imagery of gay pride and 
same-sex marriages as evidence of the moral decay of the West, while gay 
activists plead their cases to the European Court of Human Rights. 
Since 2013 in particular, the presidential discourse has emphasized 
traditional values not only as the consolidating basis of Russian society, 
but as a global dividing-line. That year, Putin lamented in front of the 
Valdai forum that Euro-Atlantic countries reject their roots, “including 
the Christian values that constitute the basis of Western civilization.” This 
“abandonment of moral principles” has led to a situation in which many 
people in the West “are embarrassed or afraid to talk about their religious 
affiliations.”100 Putin suggests that the spiritual-moral values pursued by 
Russia are widely supported abroad,101 but he stresses that Russia does not 
impose its values on others. This interpretation leans on a key concept in 
Putin’s foreign policy, national sovereignty: Putin has explained pursuing 
sovereignty as “an intrinsic part of national character.”102 In 2018, Putin 
stated that Russians value their sovereignty and independence, and added: 
“It has always been this way, at all times in the history of our state. It runs 
in the blood of our people.”103 The narratives of the moral and victorious 
nation share common ground in the idea of the world being in a state of 
“disorder.” In 2014 and 2015, the narrative of Russians as a moral nation 
developed into a more ideological one, as the political tension between 
Russia and the West grew. For example, the anti-terrorist operation in Syria 
was portrayed as a moral responsibility that Russia was prepared to take 
on when other countries were not.104 
In 2015, Putin explained the internal dynamism between the tradi-
tional religions in Russia by saying that Russia’s strength lies in “mutual 
respect and dialogue between the Orthodox, Muslims, and followers of 
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Judaism and Buddhism,” but the Orthodox faith has a special role due 
to its importance in Russian history.105 After the “conservative turn” in 
particular, the political influence of the Russian Orthodox Church has 
increased, which adds weight to the emphasis on spirituality (dukhovnost’) 
as an explicit characteristic of the nation. Because the Church enjoys rela-
tively high popular support, the state benefits from the support it gets from 
Church representatives and makes political concessions to them in return. 
Until around 2014, the president preferred “spirituality” to concepts 
like “religion” or “Orthodoxy,” in order not to contradict the narrative of 
the multinational (and multiconfessional) nation on the rhetorical level. 
However, as mentioned above, Putin broke this pattern in his speeches 
concerning the annexation of Crimea, making clear references to Orthodoxy 
as a uniting feature of the nation.106 Using Bacon’s terminology, I suggest 
that the emphasis on Orthodox faith serves as a subplot within the narrative 
of the spiritual nation: it enables the President to stress “holy” and “sacred” 
meanings that speak strongly to those who identify themselves as (cultur-
ally) Orthodox. Thus, the narrative of the moral nation rests on a hierarchy 
where Orthodoxy is the primary form of spirituality. Representatives of 
other traditional religions are included as long as they themselves commit 
to traditional values, but the “spirituality” of non-traditional religious 
communities does not belong to the “Russianness” of the presidential 
discourse.107 On a conceptual level, reinforcing traditional values has polit-
icized the term “non-traditional,” which has become a negative attribute 
in itself.
Labelling specific societal activities, politics, and identities as 
“non-traditional” in the presidential discourse marginalizes parts of the 
society and excludes them from the definition of “Russianness.” In other 
words, embracing traditional values has become a prerequisite of belong-
ing to the Russian nation. Yet the state discourse on traditional values 
reveals little about state leadership’s commitment to those values, limiting 
them as a source of state legitimacy. For example, the state leadership 
stresses “spiritual values over material ones” but cannot provide a cred-
ible answer to accusations of corruption. The emphasis on “spirituality” 
in this officially secular country, as well as the concessions made to the 
Russian Orthodox Church in the legislative sphere, have also sparked 
criticism. Moreover, the narrative of the moral nation complicates public 
discussion of problems related to sexuality and family life: Russian schools 
do not provide sexual education, public campaigns against HIV have an 
105 Vladimir Putin. 2015. “Poslanie prezidenta Federal’nomu Sobraniiu.” [Presidential Ad-
dress to the Federal Assembly]. Kremlin.ru, December 3, 2015, At http://kremlin.ru/events/
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over-sensitive tone, and domestic violence is not taken seriously by the 
legislative authorities.
Concluding Remarks: Main Narratives of the Nation and Their 
Future
The Russian state leadership formulates its nationalistic argument with 
three overlapping and interconnected narratives, which together describe a 
Russian nation that is and always has been multinational and that embraces 
“spiritual-moral” values. These characteristics have been tested in conflicts 
throughout the course of Russian history, but the nation has remained 
unified and defended its traditional values, and is therefore a victorious 
nation. 
The narrative of the multinational nation functioned first to manage 
inter-ethnic tensions within Russian society. But especially after 2013, 
it came to mark Russia’s historical difference from Western multicultur-
alism. In the light of the material presented in this article, I argue that 
the discursive shift following the annexation of Crimea in 2014 was not 
as permanent as some scholars have suggested; rather, it can be seen as 
having revitalized an pre-existing ethnically motivated subplot within the 
narrative of Russians as a multinational nation. After 2016, the ambiguity 
acquired yet another aspect: the president stresses multinationality as a 
historical characteristic of the nation, on the one hand, and primacy of 
ethnic Russianness on the other hand, while encouraging the distinctively 
civic language of legislative amendments on the Russian nation.
The narrative of the moral nation recognizes both internal and exter-
nal Others: it perceives traditional, “spiritual-moral” values as the core of 
national unity, and these values divide not only Russia, but the entire world, 
into “us” and “them.” In this view, Russia acts globally as the guardian of 
traditional values, whereas the Other dwells in moral decay. Since 2015, 
in particular, the parallels between past generations and the nation today 
have been reinforced. The President’s discourse likened the Soviet military 
to the one fighting against terrorism in Syria or parading on Red Square. 
Moreover, he emphasized that the memory of the past is “alive” and needs 
to be defended against “falsifications”—a concern to which the Kremlin 
is increasingly attentive. The narrative of the victorious nation argues that 
the generations of today have a moral obligation to follow the example of 
generations of the past, most importantly the heroes of the Great Patriotic 
War. All the narratives have a strong historical orientation: conflicts in 
the past have consolidated the Russian nation against an external enemy.
As has been presented above, none of these narratives of 
“Russianness” is novel as such; in fact, many of the explicit characteris-
tics of the nation have been re-employed from Russian and Soviet history. 
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Yet their intensity in the state discourse and the way in which they were 
consolidated in 2012–2013 make them significant now. After 2014, as 
international tensions grew into a direct conflict, the narratives helped to 
explain the fundamental differences between Russia and “the West,” and 
all of them were used to justify of the annexation of Crimea. 
In 2017–2019, the patriotic “boost” among the population began 
to wear off and domestic challenges to state legitimacy became more 
pronounced in various protests across Russia. Going forward, the political 
leadership will face increasing pressure to adjust the nationalist argument 
once again. First, the view of the traditional values as the uniting force of 
the nation has already been challenged. Second, by aiming to unite people 
through the narrative of moral and traditional nation, the state leadership 
simultaneously creates and preserves division lines within Russian society. 
Certain societal problems have also become difficult to address in the offi-
cial discourse, as according to the main narratives these problems should 
not even exist. Third, some parts of the narratives contradict the legislative 
basis of the Russian Federation. Elevating “spirituality” as an explicit char-
acteristic of the nation calls into question the secularity of the state, while 
the view that patriotism is a “unifying idea” for the people challenges the 
provision of the 1993 Constitution stating that Russia cannot have a state 
ideology. In January 2020, it became clear that the state leadership seeks to 
settle these contradictions by revising the Constitution instead of molding 
these narratives of the nation: the constitutional amendments announced 
by Putin reinforce, for instance, faith in God as a unifying factor for the 
nation, as well as Russia’s role in protecting the historical truth.108 
Having portrayed the Russian nation with these interlinked narra-
tives for several years, the political leadership may find it difficult to turn 
away from them. In recent years, the state authorities have reinforced the 
morally binding aspects of the narratives and even adjusted some state 
policies accordingly. But even with the new, ideologically reinforced 
Constitution, challenges to the state’s legitimacy remain.
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